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TREATY LAW TO SIGNAL TO OUTSIDERS: THE CASE
OF THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
Tobias Vestner*
Abstract: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
comprehensively and unequivocally prohibits nuclear weapons. The treaty was
created to foster and diffuse norms against nuclear weapons, thereby stigmatizing
and delegitimizing nuclear weapons and deterrence. The TPNW’s nature as formal
treaty under international law suggests, however, that the TPNW primarily serves
signaling to states which have not adhered to the treaty, in particular nuclear
weapon states. This article develops how treaty law enables signaling to outsiders.
Treaty law notably offers visibility, screens between “insiders” and “outsiders,”
communicates substance, and provides credibility to the signal. In line with treaty
law’s finality to establish and maintain international cooperation, this tempers
political confrontation and, by sending information and reducing uncertainty,
creates a basis for extra-regime cooperation. The article then demonstrates how and
what the TPNW signals, namely that nuclear weapons are illegal, immoral, and
dangerous and that nuclear disarmament should advance. The article contends that
the TPNW most effectively signals that its States parties want nothing to do with
nuclear weapons. Thereby, the TPNW resembles treaties establishing nuclear
weapons free zones (NWFZ) and provides a basis for negative security assurances
(NSA), which would represent a form of contracting between TPNW States parties
and nuclear weapon states. The article concludes that assessments of political
effects of international treaties need to consider their formality and legal
consequences to a greater extent.
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INTRODUCTION
The international legal landscape regarding the legality of nuclear
weapons has significantly changed since the entry into force of the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)1 on January 22, 2021. The
TPNW prohibits several activities related to nuclear weapons, including their
possession, threats of use, and actual use. The TPNW originated out of a
frustration that nuclear weapon states (NWS)—China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States—as well as other states possessing
nuclear weapons did not engage in negotiations on nuclear disarmament
according to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT).2 Its creation primarily aims to foster existing norms against
nuclear weapons, commonly referred to as the “nuclear taboo,”3 which arise
from the ethical wrong of killing and injuring thousands, if not millions, of

1

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, July 7, 2017, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter TPNW].
As of May 1, 2022, sixty States have ratified or accessioned to the treaty, and twenty-nine additional States
are signatories. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT
AFFS., https://treaties.unoda.org/t/tpnw (last visited May 23, 2022) [hereinafter TPNW Status].
2
Shannon N. Kile, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, in STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RSCH.
INST., SIPRI YEARBOOK 2018: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 307, 307–318
(2018); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161
[hereinafter NPT].
3
The “nuclear taboo” describes the social norms that prevent political decisionmakers from even
considering using nuclear weapons because this would not be appropriate. Daryl G. Press, Scott D. Sagan &
Benjamin A. Valentino, Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use
of Nuclear Weapons, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 188, 188–206 (2013); Nina Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo: The
United States and Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use, 29 INT’L ORG. 433, 433–468 (1999).
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civilians by a nuclear strike. As such, the TPNW is the most recent creation
of the humanitarian disarmament paradigm.4
While the TPNW has been widely debated and analyzed, the role of
international law on the TPNW’s political effects remains largely unexplored
and underdeveloped. This article argues that, based on treaty law’s formalism
and legal effects, the TPNW first and foremost serves as signaling device for
States parties to send information to outsiders, namely States that have not
joined the treaty. In Part I, this article assesses the debate on the TPNW and
its political effects and indicates weaknesses of existing analyses to locate the
theoretical proposition and its application to the TPNW. In Part II, this article
develops how treaty law enables signaling to outsiders. In particular, treaty
law offers visibility, screens between “insiders” and “outsiders,”
communicates substance, and provides credibility to the treaty’s signal. In line
with treaty law’s finality to establish and maintain international cooperation,
the signaling by treaty tempers political confrontation and, by sending
information and reducing uncertainty, creates a basis for extra-regime
cooperation.
In Part III, this article demonstrates how and what the TPNW signals,
namely that nuclear weapons are illegal, immoral, and dangerous, and that
nuclear disarmament should advance. The article finds that while the TPNW’s
principal message is that “the states parties want nothing to do with nuclear
weapons, nor should the outsiders have anything to do with nuclear weapons,”
as per treaty law’s functioning, the TPNW more effectively signals “the states
parties want nothing to do with nuclear weapons.” The TPNW thus does more
than provide “emptily divisive virtue-signaling,” as argued by Christopher
Ashley Ford at the Wilton Park conference in 2018, then Assistant Secretary
at the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation of the United
States.5 An implication of the TPNW’s signaling is that the TPNW resembles
treaties establishing nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ). Thereby, the treaty
provides a basis for negative security assurances (NSA),6 which would
represent a form of contracting between TPNW States parties and NWS. This
article concludes that assessments of political effects of international

4

See generally MARC FINAUD, “HUMANITARIAN DISARMAMENT”: POWERFUL NEW PARADIGM OR
NAIVE UTOPIA? (2017); Denise Garcia, Humanitarian Security Regimes, 91 INT’L AFFS. 55 (2015); UNITED
NATIONS INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RSCH., VIEWING NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH A HUMANITARIAN LENS
(Jon Borrie & Tim Caughley eds., 2013).
5
Christopher A. Ford, The P5 Process and Approaches to Nuclear Disarmament: A New Structured
Dialogue, NEW PARADIGMS FORUM (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/p2312.
6
NSA are declarations, policies, or agreements by which NWS assure to not use or threaten the use
of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.
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agreements needs to consider treaties’ formality and legal effects to a greater
extent.
I.

CURRENT DEBATE AND EXPLANATIONS
A.

Strengthening Social Norms

Both diplomatic discourse and academic writing describes the TPNW’s
effect on international politics as fostering and shifting existing social norms
against the possession and use of nuclear weapons. While the TPNW has been
described by proponents and observers as “an interim step, a means to an end”
to achieve complete abolition of nuclear weapons,7 Beatrice Fihn, Executive
Director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN),
proclaimed that the TPNW would contribute to strengthening the view that
nuclear weapons are “unacceptable” and “illegal,” both in national contexts
and within the international community.8
With an increased concern regarding the use of nuclear weapons and
the adherence to the idea of a ban, countries that are not parties to the TPNW
may feel that “the stigma against their use (and even their deployment) is so
strong that behavior is changed . . . .”9 The TPNW could “lessen [nuclear
weapons’] attractiveness and change the incentive structures for states that
possess them and others that rely on extended nuclear deterrence.”10 The
TPNW could further stigmatize the possession and possible use of nuclear
weapons by making them “incompatible with the principles of human rights
and humanitarian law, becoming increasingly unattractive to governments
that wish to be viewed in good standing in the international community.”11 As
such, the TPNW would be central to the moral delegitimization of the weapon
of mass destruction (WMD).12 Ultimately, a new norm whereby not
7

Rebecca Davis Gibbons, The Humanitarian Turn in Nuclear Disarmament and the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 25 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 11, 35 (2018).
8
Marjolijn Van Deelen, et al., Remarks at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 22
(Mar. 21, 2017) (transcript on file with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
9
PAX CHRISTI INTERNATIONAL, THE HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 9–10
(2013).
10
Ramesh Thakur, The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament, 40
WASH. Q. 71, 71–95 (2017).
11
RAY ACHESON & BEATRICE FIHN, PREVENTING COLLAPSE: THE NPT AND A BAN ON NUCLEAR
WEAPONS 3 (2013).
12
Michael Hamel-Green, The Nuclear Ban Treaty and 2018 Disarmament Forums: An Initial Impact
Assessment, 1 J. PEACE & NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 2, 440 (2018) [hereinafter Hamel-Green, Nuclear Ban
Treaty]; Nick Ritchie & Kjølv Egeland, The Diplomacy of Resistance: Power, Hegemony and Nuclear
Disarmament, 30 J. GLOB. CHANGE, PEACE & SEC. 121, 121–42 (2018); Nick Ritchie, Legitimizing and
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possessing nuclear weapons is “normal” could stigmatize NWS to reduce, and
eventually eliminate, their arsenal.13
Most proponents of this strategy acknowledge that such stigmatization
is a lengthy process,14 and others doubt its achievement. Some noted that
NWS could react to stigmatization in a refractory, negative way.15 Others
contend that stigmatization and “normative pressure” is impracticable because
public opinion would not be universally opposed to nuclear weapons, and the
domestic political structures of certain countries would not be equally
receptive to public pressure.16 Similarly, others critique that the TPNW’s
norm lifecycle would get stuck in the norm’s emergence phase, failing to
reach subsequent norm cascade and internalization. Moreover, even if the
TPNW could lead to some level of stigmatization and delegitimization of
nuclear weapons, it would not lead to their elimination.17 Others argue that the
TPNW would fracture the existing nuclear non-proliferation system,
including removing resources and attention.18
Hence, most analyses of the TPNW explain its creation and function
based on its ability to foster and diffuse norms,19 mostly in line with norm

Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons, in VIEWING NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH A HUMANITARIAN LENS 44,
44–75 (Jon Borrie & Tim Caugley eds., 2013).
13
Tom Sauer & Mathias Reveraert, The Potential Stigmatizing Effect of the Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons, 25 THE NONPROLIFERATION REV. 437, 437–55, 448–47 (2018). For further discussion
on stigmatization, see JONATHAN L. BLACK-BRANCH, THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: LEGAL CHALLENGES FOR MILITARY DOCTRINES AND DETERRENCE POLICIES 284–305 (2021).
14
Sauer & Revaert, supra note 12, at 450; see also Marianne Hanson, Normalizing Zero Nuclear
Weapons: The Humanitarian Road to the Prohibition Treaty, 39 CONTEMP. SEC. POL’Y 464, 477 (2018).
15
Sauer & Revaert, supra note 12, at 444.
16
Michael Onderco, Why Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty is Unlikely to Fulfil Its Promise, 3 GLOB. AFFS.
391, 397 (2017).
17
See Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer, The Forever-Emerging Norm of Banning Nuclear Weapons, J.
STRATEGIC STUD. 1, 1–27 (2020).
18
Hamel-Green, Nuclear Ban Treaty, supra note 1212, at 449; Kjølv Egeland et al., The Nuclear
Weapons Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Regime, 34 MEDICINE, CONFLICT & SURVIVAL 74, 84 (2018);
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Michael Biontino, Permanent Representative of Germany, to the Conference
on Disarmament, Open Ended Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament (Feb. 24, 2016).
19
See also Moritz Kütt & Jens Steffek, Comprehensive Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: An Emerging
International Norm, 22 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 401, 401–420 (2015). In the reverse, for a discussion of
how norm emergence theories fit, do not fit, and should adapt to reflect the process of the TPNW see John
Borrie et al., Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons, 30 GLOB. CHANGE, PEACE & SEC. 95, 95–119 (2018); John Borrie, Humanitarian
Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban, INT’L AFFS 625, 625–646 (2014).
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evolution theory,20 which has been used to explain the creation of other
weapons ban treaties.21
B.

The Political Discourse

The politics surrounding the TPNW resemble a battle of discourse and
norms between TPNW proponents and opponents.22 A global campaign of
non-governmental organizations, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS), and individuals actively
promotes the TPNW and shapes the relevant discourse, mobilizing
international and domestic actors.23 Among NNWS, Austria, Brazil, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, and the Philippines are particularly vocal.
NWS vehemently counter the benefits of the TPNW. They claim that
the TPNW divides and polarizes the international community, ultimately
impeding collaboration towards nuclear disarmament. The United States, the
United Kingdom, and France challenge the TPNW, declaring it is
“incompatible with the policy of nuclear deterrence, which has been essential

20

Norm evolution theory describes the conditions and tendencies regarding the creation, diffusion,
internalization, and effects of social norms of behavior. See Judith Kelley, Assessing the Complex Evolution
of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring, 62 INT’L ORG. 221, 221–255 (2008); Martha
Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887,
887–917 (1998); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
21
Garcia, supra note 4, at 55–75; see generally Charli R. Carpenter, Vetting the Advocacy Agenda:
Network Centrality and the Paradox of Weapons Norms, 65 INT’L ORG. 69 (2011); RICHARD PRICE, THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS TABOO (1997).
22
For an in-depth analysis of the different states’ views, see ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE,
BREAKTHROUGH OR BREAKPOINT? EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP NETWORK, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
NUCLEAR BAN TREATY (Shatabisha Shetty & Denitsa Raynova eds., 2017).
23
Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director, Int’l Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Address to UN
High-Level Ceremony on TPNW’s Entry into Force (Jan. 22, 2021) [hereinafter Fihn Speech]; The
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Celebrates the Entry into Force of the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-red-cross-and-red-crescent-movement-entry-force-treatyprohibition-nuclear-weapons; Former Leaders and Ministers of US Allies Urge States to Join the Nuclear
Weapon Ban Treaty, INT’L CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://www.icanw.org/56_former_leaders; Joint Interfaith on the Entry into Force of the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, SOKKA GAKKAI INT’L OFF. FOR UNITED NATIONS AFFS. (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://sgi-ouna.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Interfaith-Statement-on-the-TPNW-EIF.pdf; NATO HQ
Steps Up Misinformation Campaign Against TPNW, INT’L CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Dec.
17, 2020), https://www.icanw.org/nato_hq_steps_up_misinformation_campaign_against_tpnw; Alicia
Sanders-Zakre, Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty to Enter Into Force: What’s Next?, ARMS CONTROL TODAY
(Nov. 2020), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-11/features/nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-enter-intoforce-whats-next#:~:text=24%2C%2084%20nations%20had%20signed,force%20on%20January%2022%2
C%202021.
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to keeping the peace in Europe and North Asia for over 70 years.”24 Russia
also stated that the “repercussions [of a ban] for the viability and the
comprehensive nature of the NPT would be catastrophic”25 and that the
intentions of TPNW advocates would be “dangerous and delusionary.”26 A
joint statement by the five permanent members (P5) of the United Nations
Security Council also called the TPNW inappropriate.27 In addition, an
informal group of forty-two States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) have argued against the TPNW.28
The change in Administration in the United States in 2021 has not
fundamentally altered the position of the United States. The Biden
Administration does not openly counter the TPNW, yet it has also not
officially revoked or nuanced the United States’ position towards the TPNW,
thereby indicating that the United States continues to not support the TPNW.
Other States, notably France, avoid implicit endorsement of the TNPW by
stressing their opposition to the TNPW, thereby aiming to prevent the
emergence of related customary international law.
C.

Legal Implications and Effects

The TPNW’s legal implications have received a fair amount of
attention in both public discourse and academic writing. Proponents of the
TPNW repeatedly argued that the treaty “fills a legal gap,” making nuclear

24

Press Release, Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of
the United States, United Kingdom, and France Following the Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapons, U.S. Mission to the United Nations (July 7, 2017) [hereinafter Joint Statement]; Christopher Ford,
Senior Director, U.S. Nat’l Sec. Council, Briefing on Nuclear Ban Treaty at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (Aug. 22, 2017).
25
Egeland et al., supra note 18, at 80, 89; U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., 22nd mtg at 3, 21, 60, U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/71/PV.22 (Oct. 27, 2016).
26
Russia Not to Join Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty, Says Lavrov, TASS (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://tass.com/politics/1087735.
27
The P5 are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. P5 Joint
Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, GOV.UK (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/p5-joint-statement-on-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-ofnuclear-weapons [hereinafter P5 Joint Statement].
28
The Status of the TPNW, NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR, www.banmonitor.org/tpnw-status
(last visited Apr. 15, 2021); North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Sep. 20, 2017), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_1469
54.htm; see also Steven Hill, NATO and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, CHATHAM HOUSE
(Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/01/nato-and-treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons; Paul
Meyer, Between a Rock and a Hard Place; NATO’s Non-Nuclear Weapon States, the NPT and the TPNW,
TODA PEACE INST. (Nov. 26, 2020), https://toda.org/global-outlook/between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-natosnon-nuclear-weapon-states-the-npt-and-the-tpnw.html; BLACK-BRANCH, supra note 13, at 115.

SPRING 2022

TREATY LAW TO SIGNAL TO OUTSIDERS

427

weapons illegal under international law.29 Such illegality would strengthen the
view that nuclear weapons are illegitimate and not acceptable. On the other
hand, the P5 declared that the “TPNW will not be binding on our countries,
and we do not accept any claim that it contributes to the development of
customary international law.”30 The United States, the United Kingdom, and
France also insist that “there will be no change in the legal obligations on our
countries with respect to nuclear weapons.”31 Several studies analyze the
entire treaty or its provisions from a legal perspective.32 A particular focus is
on how the treaty fits into the existing legal framework, notably its
relationship with the NPT and customary international law.33
Yet the role of international law in the political enterprise to foster and
diffuse norms that stigmatize and delegitimize nuclear weapons remains
29

Already at the Vienna Conference on Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons in 2014, Austria
pledged to work with other states to “fill the legal gap.” See Humanitarian Pledge, INT’L CAMPAIGN TO
ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, https://web.archive.org/web/20190623105035/http://www.icanw.org/pledge
(last visited Apr. 15, 2021); Here Are Five Examples of the Type of Activities that Will Be Illegal Under
International Law on 22 January 2021, INT’L CAMPAIGN ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Dec. 29, 2020),
https://www.icanw.org/here_are_five_examples_of_the_type_of_activities_that_will_be_illegal_under_int
ernational_law_on_22_january_2021; Robert Mardini, Op. Ed: Nuclear Weapons Are Finally Outlawed;
Next Step is Disarmament, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/
nuclear-weapons-are-finally-outlawed-next-step-disarmament; Ramesh Thakur, Always Immoral, Now
Illegal: The Nuclear Ban Treaty Becomes Law, AUSTRALIAN INST. INT’L AFFS. (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/always-immoral-now-illegal-the-nuclear-bantreaty-becomes-law/; Nuclear Weapons Are Illegal At Last, GREENPEACE (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/46233/nuclear-weapons-illegal-treaty/#:~:text=In%202010
%2C%20ICAN%20started%20working,(122)%20adopted%20the%20TPNW.&text=So%20today%2C%20
22%20January%202021%2C%20nuclear%20weapons%20become%20illegal!; Gro Nystuen & Kjølv
Egeland, A ‘Legal Gap’? Nuclear Weapons Under International Law, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (Mar. 2016),
https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_03/Features/A-Legal-Gap-Nuclear-Weapons-Under-InternationalLaw.
30
P5 Joint Statement, supra note 27.
31
Joint Statement, supra note 24.
32
Dieter Fleck, The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Challenges for International Law
and Security, in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: VOLUME IV, HUMAN
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 395, 395–414 (Jonathan L. BlackBranch & Dieter Fleck eds., 2019); Nobuo Hayashi, Is the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty Accessible to
Umbrella States, in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 377, 378–394 (Jonathan L.
Black-Branch & Dieter Fleck eds., 2019); Monika Subritzky, An Analysis of the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Light of its Form and Framework Agreement, 9 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 367, 367–384
(2019); Newell Highsmith & Mallory Stewart, The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Legal Analysis, 60 SURVIVAL 129,
129–152 (2018); Daniel Rietiker, New Hope for Nuclear Disarmament of “Much Ado About Nothing?”:
Legal Assessment of the New “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” and the Joint Statement by
the USA, UK, and France Following its Adoption, 59 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 22, 22–32 (2017); see generally
STUART CASEY-MASLEN, THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A COMMENTARY
(2019).
33
For a discussion on this and the argument that the TPNW is compatible with the NPT regime, see
Egeland et al., supra note 18, at 74–94. See also Edward M. Ifft & David A. Koplow, Legal and Political
Myths of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 77 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 134, 134–139
(2021).
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largely unexplored. The predominant reasoning seems based on the
assumption that the treaty would codify and diffuse norms that influence
international affairs and State behavior even beyond its members.34 Although
such logic has been discussed,35 it has not been systematically applied to the
TPNW yet. Based on norm contestation as the framework of analysis, it has
been argued that the existence of two legal frameworks regarding nuclear
weapons, namely that of the NPT and the TPNW, would create a tension as to
which framework takes precedence and is more legitimate. The discourse
could shift from assessing the legitimacy of nuclear weapons to assessing the
legitimacy of the TPNW itself.36 Others identify that legal uncertainty could
undermine existing norms.37
The common analysis of the TPNW’s political influence largely
neglects the formality and legal effects of treaty law. Yet the treaty’s impact
on international politics cannot be dissociated from its formality and legal
effects because States—the principal subjects of international law—continue
to pay particular attention to treaties’ formality. This is reflected by legal
positivism, the predominant legal theory in international law, which focuses
on what the law is and what it is not as opposed to what the law represents or
should be.38 In addition, international treaties’ formalism is what distinguishes
these agreements from politically binding instruments or so-called soft law.39
As a formal source of international law, treaties remain the primary tool to
establish and maintain institutionalized cooperation.40
The question thus arises: how does the fact that the TPNW is a formal
treaty under international law affect the politics of nuclear weapons? At the
outset, the treaty establishes a legal divide between the States which have
adhered to it and those which have not. Only States that have adhered to the
TPNW are bound by the treaty’s rules. This divide allows TPNW proponents
to confront NWS. Hence, the formalism of treaty law suggests that an
alternative mechanism besides norm diffusion is at play: The TPNW serves
34

For such a theory, see generally ADAM BOWER, NORMS WITHOUT THE GREAT POWERS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHANGING SOCIETAL STANDARDS IN WORLD POLITICS (2017).
35
Harald Müller & Carmen Wunderlich, Nuclear Disarmament Without the Nuclear-Weapon States:
The Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty, 149 DAEDALUS 171, 171–189 (2020).
36
Laura Considine, Contests of Legitimacy and Value: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons and the Logic of Prohibition, 95 INT’L AFFS. 1075, 1076 (2019).
37
Egeland et al., supra note 18, at 81; Fleck, supra note 32; Hayashi, supra note 32; Highsmith supra
note 32, at 129–152.
38
See Jorg Kammerhofer, International Legal Positivism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 408–26 (Ann Orford & Florian Hoffman eds., 2015).
39
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L
ORG. 421, 421–456 (2003).
40
HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37–59 (2d ed., 2019).
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States parties to signal to NWS and other States that remain outside the
regime. The following section develops how treaty law enables participating
States to signal to States that have not adhered to a given treaty.
II.

TREATY AS DEVICE TO SIGNAL TO OUTSIDERS

In a world of uncertainty, States signal to other States to share
information. Signaling theory was developed in economics to describe
situations whereby two parties possess different information, and each must
figure out how to communicate said information to the other, as well as how
to interpret the received information.41 In other words, signaling is when an
actor has information which could be relevant to another actor’s decisionmaking and the actor chooses to signal this information,42 serving as an act
of communication that reduces uncertainty regarding how other States might
behave.43 Signals provide information about their senders, such as values and
their stance on a topic. Signals also help the receiver understand who the
sender is and how they intend on behaving.44 This helps the receiver make
informed decisions about their own behavior.45
Signals need a means for communication,46 and to be credible the
means must be costly.47 Indeed, if sending a signal is cost-free, then anyone
could send the signal, even without the intention to engage in the associated
behavior, which makes the signal lose its meaning.48 The most prominent
types of costly signals are those based on “hand-tying” and “sunk costs.”49
Hand-tying reflects ex post costs that arise when a government commits to an
action yet does not follow through, generally via the negative reaction of
domestic political stakeholders and the electorate, also termed audience
41

Brian L. Connelly, Trevis Certo, R. Duane Ireland & Christoper R. Reutzel, Signaling Theory: A
Review Assessment, 37 J. MGMT. 39, 39–67 (2011); see also DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 629–50 (1990); A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATION TRANSFER IN HIRING AND
RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES (1974).
42
James D. Morrow, The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in
International Politics, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 77, 86 (David A. Lake &
Robert Powell eds., 1999).
43
Brian C Rathbun, Uncertain About Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial
Concept in International Relations Theory, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 533, 535 (2007).
44
ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19–22 (2000).
45
Rathbun, supra note 43, at 543, 547.
46
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 51 (1980).
47
James Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs, 41 J.
CONFLICT RES. 68, 68–90 (1997); James Fearon, Threats to Use of Force: Costly Signals and Bargaining in
International Crises (1992) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California).
48
David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 885
(2002).
49
Fearon, supra note 47.
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costs.50 Sunk costs refer to costs that arise prior to communicating the
commitment, such as mobilizing troops, which generates costs from the
moment they get mobilized. As signals provide information about future State
behavior, they can facilitate cooperation.51
International treaties enable States to signal their intentions. The act of
ratifying a treaty sends a signal to the international community that the State
accepts the standard set by the treaty.52 In this context, States with “lowdiscount rates” are States which signal the intention of a certain behavior and
follow through, whereas States with “high-discount rates” are States that
signal but will not engage in the respective behavior.53 Costly signals show,
convey, and convince that the State has low-discount rates. States with lowdiscount rates are thus more likely to cooperate. Treaty ratification can be a
form of costly signaling as the ratification process involves ex ante costs for
treaty ratification,54 notably when policies need to be adapted to comply with
the treaty, or when ratification generates ex post costs by being tied by the
treaty,55 as the treaty obligates certain behavior.
States signal via treaties in the context of nuclear weapons. The NPT
and NWFZ treaties screen state behavior and offer information about their
States parties’ intentions.56 Scholars have argued that adherence to the NPT
would be a costly signal and would signal peaceful intentions, despite the risk
of States cheating.57 Formal defense pacts with NWS also allow nuclear

50

Jack Snyder & Erica D. Borghard, The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound, 105 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 437, 437–456 (2011); Michael Tomz, Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An
Experimental Approach, 61 INT’L ORG. 821, 821–840 (2007).
51
Moore finds that signals play a larger role in the diplomatic and economic fields than the military
domain. Moore, supra note 48, at 898; Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and
Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 624–25, 664–66, 674–75 (2001).
52
JAMES D. MORROW, ORDER WITHIN ANARCHY: THE LAW OF WAR AS AN INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTION 55 (2014).
53
POSNER, supra note 44, at 18.
54
Lisa L. Martin, The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices, 35
PRES. STUD. Q. 440, 449 (2005); Jana von Stein, Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty
Compliance, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 611, 611–622 (2005).
55
Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in
International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819, 819 (2000).
56
Matthew Fuhrmann & Yonathan Lupu, Do Arms Control Treaties Work? Assessing the
Effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 60 INT’L STUD. Q. 530, 553 (2016); MATTHEW
FUHRMANN & XIAOJUN LI, RETHINKING RATIFICATION: LEGALIZATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE
TREATIES 12–14 (2009); Christopher Way & Karthika Sasikumar, Leaders and Laggards: When and Why
Do Countries Sign the NPT? 32 (Research Grp. Int’l Sec. & Glob. and Nat’l Sec. State, Working Paper No.
16, 2004).
57
Manseok Lee & Michael Nacht, Challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 14 STRATEGIC
STUD. Q. 95, 106 (2020); see also Etel Solingen, The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint, 19 INT’L SEC.
126, 140 (1994).
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alliances to serve as signals that enable extended nuclear deterrence.58
Although no explanation has been offered on how the law enables such
signaling, this finding is particularly relevant as alliance commitments are
agreements that intend to signal to States other than to those party to the
agreements.
The theoretical foundation of signaling, in conjunction with treaty law’s
formal functioning, leads to how multilateral treaties can serve as a means to
signal political messages to outsiders, namely States that have not joined the
treaty. Treaty law’s nature and characteristics enable but also limit signaling.
A treaty’s procedural formalities offer visibility to the signal and screen
between the senders of the signal and the receivers. A treaty’s substance
defines the specific content of the signal. A treaty’s contractual nature gives
credibility to the signal. The following develops these theoretical
underpinnings in more detail.
A.

Visibility and Screening

A political message that goes unnoticed cannot reach and impact its
intended audience. Unless conducted secretly, multilateral treaties’ creation
processes generally procure high levels of visibility among States. Invitations
to or information about multilateral negotiations, notably at the United
Nations, communicate to States that a new treaty is being envisioned,
eventually forcing States to take position on the issue. The formal adoption of
a treaty generates strong publicity, in particular when involving press
statements and official celebrations. Heads of States, ministers,
parliamentarians, and populations take notice that a new signal is emerging.
Treaty formalities further screen and inform regarding which States
adhere to the message and which do not. A treaty depositary’s repository, in
the case of the United Nations, its treaty collection database, provides
permanent and updated information on which States have signed and ratified
the treaty, including potential reservations (where they are permissible). State
adherence can be quantitatively and qualitatively identified through a treaty’s
depositary repository. As such, the procedural formalities screen States that
are “in” and those that are “out.” While negotiations allow States a certain
ambivalence towards a treaty, a treaty’s requirement of ratification leaves no
doubt as to whether the State adheres to the signal or not, no matter how
sympathetic a state, government, officials, or population may be towards the
58

Matthew Fuhrmann & Todd S. Sechser, Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk
Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 919, 920 (2014).
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cause. This also avoids gradual buy-in by States, although a State’s signature
may already be perceived as some sort of commitment. This formal and rigid
screening ultimately enables the States parties to signal information to the
outsiders through treaties.
This division brought by treaty law has a particular legal implication.
As much as a State that adheres to a treaty becomes bound by it, a State that
does not join a treaty remains bound by other international law applicable to
the issue. Treaty law does not foresee a mechanism by which it influences the
law applicable to non-states parties, also known as the relative effects of
treaties.59 As such, States that do not adhere to a treaty not only do not share
its signal but also prefer other legal rules. Non-adherence can thus be
interpreted as communicating other perceptions, values, and intentions,
particularly if the decision not to join the treaty is deliberate. In addition,
States may solidify the implied legal division by actively communicating their
unaltered legal position through declarations, statements by alliances, or
opposing agreements.
B.

Substance

Treaty law defines and enables clarification of a given signal’s
substance, which offers several advantages. Since a treaty is legally binding,
States tend to be more carefully regarding treaty substance than regarding the
substance of politically binding instruments.60 Established “treaty language”
further allows for precision and clarity, as well as deliberate indeterminacy.
Treaty rules also tend to be relatively fixed, which ensures a certain constancy

59

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
VCLT] (“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”). For
commentary on art. 34, see Emmanuel Klimis, Article 34: General rule regarding third organizations, in
THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 897 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein
eds., 2011), which cites concurring jurisprudence including Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgment,
1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13, ¶ 26 (June 3) and Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 554,
¶¶ 44–50 (Dec. 22). For discussion on consent to be bound see Oliver Dörr, Article 11: Means of Expressing
Consent to be Bound by a Treaty, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 153–162 (Oliver Dörr
& Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012). In Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Koskenniemi has
suggested that treaty rules can be interpreted in light of their legal environment. See infra note 170; Int’l Law
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-First Session, Supp. No. 10, ¶ 251, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006). This
is not a majority view, however. For such an argument in the context of nuclear weapons see DANIEL
RIETIKER, HUMANIZATION OF ARMS CONTROL: PAVING THE WAY FOR A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS 141–253, 166 (2017).
60
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 39, at 421; Daniel Bodansky, Legally Binding Versus Non-Legally
Binding Instruments, in TOWARDS A WORKABLE AND EFFECTIVE CLIMATE REGIME 155, 160–61 (Scott Barrett
et al. eds., 2015).
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and permanency of the signal.61 Furthermore, treaty interpretation rules
provide internationally shared methods for finding and understanding its
meaning.62 As both treaty insiders and outsiders use the same treaty
interpretation rules, this facilitates coherent and mutual understanding by the
signal’s senders and receivers.
Although a treaty can contain any substance except rules in
contradiction with ius cogens,63 treaty law does not enable signaling all
content equally well. A treaty’s substance can be aspirational, reflect a moral
cause, or simply define what States intend to do. As a contractual arrangement
between States, however, the essence of a treaty is the rights and obligations
it procures. This means that the most important aspect of a treaty refers to
what States agree to do or refrain from doing, which is manifested in its
operational provisions. A treaty’s preamble, on the contrary, serves to
communicate how the States parties view the world or how the world should
be. According to treaty interpretation rules, the preamble serves to inform the
meaning of the terms of the treaty as well as to clarify the treaty’s object and
purpose.64
Yet, a preamble does not have any independent legal value, suggesting
that the central message most authoritatively and effectively communicated is
the one that is backed by the operational provisions, namely those that define
the rights and obligations. Accordingly, signaling by treaty has an inherent
focus on what States do, and less so on what they believe or want from others.
This is not only due to a treaty’s structure and content, but also because of its
contractual nature.
C.

Credibility

A treaty provides credibility for its signal through its contractual nature.
As contractual agreements, multilateral treaties create a high number of legal
61

Evolutionary treaty interpretation might be justified in certain cases, however. See EIRIK BJORGE,
THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 56–141 (2014).
62
RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 496 (2015); see VCLT, supra note 59.
63
Ius cogens is “a peremptory norm of general international law […] accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” VCLT,
supra note 59, art. 53. For a discussion on peremptory norms of international law see Jochen A. Frowein, Ius
Cogens, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013).
64
The preamble is part of the context. VCLT, supra note 59, art. 31(2). Further, the “preamble is
generally very useful for the determination of the ‘object’ and ‘purpose’ of the instrument to be construed.”
Golder v. The United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1, 12, ¶ 34 (1975). See also JEAN-MARC SOREL,
Article 31 VCLT, in THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 838 (Olivier
Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011)
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commitments between States parties. In Roman law, the legal essence of an
agreement was described as do ut des, namely “I give so that you may give,”
which implies an inherent sense of reciprocity that one party’s performance
satisfies the condition for the other party’s performance.65 Such legal
commitments bind States to comply with the treaty’s legal obligations,
ultimately reducing States’ freedom to maneuver as they forego potential
policy options.66
The constraining of States’ freedom is based on the premise that States
honor their commitments. As a general principle of international law, pacta
sunt servanda implies that States must respect their legal engagements.67
Concretely, treaty law’s mechanism for creating and maintaining international
cooperation among States parties ties their “hands.” Treaty law imposes
constraints on actors which maximize individual and collective gains,68
ultimately serving as a tool to express expectations of behavior.69 As such,
international agreements enable States to minimize or eradicate cooperation
problems including cheating, asymmetry, and uncertainty about the behavior
and expectations of others.70 While treaties can be perceived as social
contracts among States,71 independently thereof, they promote structured
interactions between States leading to cooperative behavior.72 Moreover,
reputational concerns,73 reciprocity,74 enforcement by other states,75 and norm
65

Do ut des, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Aaron Xavier Fellmeth & Maurice Horwitz,
eds., 2d ed. 2011).
66
ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL
ECONOMY 97 (1984); see also Simmons, supra note 55, at 819.
67
For discussion on pacta sunt servanda, see Jean Salmon, Article 26 1969 VCLT, in THE VIENNA
CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 897 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
68
See, e.g., Scott Barrett, A Theory of Full International Cooperation, in 11 J. THEORETICAL POL. 519,
521 (1999). In a similar fashion, Ikenberry argues that order in the international community is attributable to
and maintained by rules and arrangements. Following this idea, what states gain via rules is order, hence the
previsibility of behavior by other States. G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS, CRISIS
AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER 12–13 (2011)
69
LESLIE JOHNS, STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COURTS: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF LEGALIZATION 13
(2015).
70
See BARBARA KOREMENOS, THE CONTINENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPLAINING AGREEMENT
DESIGN 31–40 (2016).
71
Roger D. Congleton, The Institution of International Treaty Organizations as Evidence for Social
Contract Theory, 63 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 1, 2 (2020).
72
See generally John J. Setear, Law in the Service of Politics: Moving Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
from Metaphor to Theory by Using the International Treaty Process to Define ‘Iteration,’ 37 VA. J. INT’L L.
641 (1997).
73
Reputation is a concept developed in chapter three of the following, as part of Guzman’s theory on
international law. ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 71–
117 (2010).
74
MORROW, supra note 52, at 124, 179–350.
75
For background on enforcement theory, see generally MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND
PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT (2008).
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internalization76 make States respect their legal obligations and ultimately
reduce the likelihood of defection.
The associated constraints are costly. Costs tend to arise prior to
adherence when a State must change its policies or laws to comply with the
treaty obligations.77 Costs may also result from the domestic ratification
procedure, which may involve bureaucratic efforts.78 Once ratified, treaty
ratification cannot be easily reversed. For States parties already in compliance
with a treaty’s obligations prior to adherence, these costs are minimal. But
costs arise nonetheless if a State were to change its behavior in the future
because the commitment limits future policy options. Overall, if any such
costs are too high for certain states, thereby dissuading them from adhering,
this strengthens a treaty’s ability to credibly signal as it excludes states that
are not willing to commit to its content.
D.

Treaty Law’s Opportunities and Limits

Treaty law’s functioning as a formal, contractual arrangement for
establishing and maintaining international cooperation allows signaling to
states that have not adhered to the given treaty. A treaty’s precise and effective
signaling is enabled by its visibility, its screening regarding which states are
“in” and which “out”, its substance and methods for interpretation, as well as
its credibility arising from its contractual nature. As such, intra-regime
collaboration serves extra-regime communication.
Yet, formal functioning, rigidity, and reliance of treaty law on State
consent also leads to limits. As treaties establish a legal divide between its
States parties and outsiders, this has an exclusionary result. It is not possible
to transpose legal effects from the treaty regime to the other applicable law.
The legal division implies that those States that have not adhered to the treaty
are clearly bound by other international rules. These states are thereby not
only shielded from legal effects, but their non-adherence also indicates that
they do not share the treaty’s message. Moreover, by their formality and
rigidity, treaties undermine easier ways to signal similar concerns, as their
credibility lessens that of alternative, less formal means for signaling, such as
unilateral policies or politically binding agreements. The potentially high
76

On international norm internalization, see generally THOMAS RISSE, STEPHEN C. ROPP & KATHRYN
SIKKINK, THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (1999); Harlan
Grant Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65 (2007).
For a discussion on how states interests are integrated into international law, see IAN HURD, HOW TO DO
THINGS WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 97–100 (2017).
77
von Stein, supra note 54.
78
Martin, supra note 54, at 449.
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costs for treaty adherence also impede States’ easy transition from one camp
to another, ultimately hampering change.
As a result, signaling by treaty may influence outsiders by
communicating intentions, values, and expectations from States parties so that
the outsiders can make informed policy decisions, thereby reducing
uncertainty. Yet political messages signaled by treaty cannot directly
influence or alter their audience’ political or legal positions. The targeted
States keep full autonomy over their actions. As a consequence, even when
States cooperate by treaty to confront outsiders with signals, treaty law’s
functioning tempers this confrontation. Rather, as a treaty’s signaling provides
information on its States parties’ intentions, this can provide a basis for
cooperation between the treaty’s membership and outsiders. Intra-regime
cooperation for signaling thus means signaling for potential extra-regime
cooperation. As such, even if States use treaties for exclusionary and
confrontational purposes, treaty law remains biased towards cooperation as
per its fundamental design, functioning, and finality.
III.

THE TPNW’S SIGNALING

The following demonstrates how and what the TPNW signals to
outsiders. It does so by retracing the treaty’s negotiations history and
assessing its current status, by analyzing the treaty’s substance, and by
contrasting the treaty’s signaling with the international law to which the
outsiders remain bound. The section then identifies and discusses the findings’
implications on the TPNW and related politics.
A.

Creating a Legal Division

The intellectual history of the TPNW process dates back to the
invention of nuclear weapons since their ban had been attempted shortly
thereafter. The United Nations General Assembly’s very first resolution of
January 24, 1946 addressed nuclear weapons and established a commission to
make specific proposals, inter alia, “for the elimination from national
armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction.”79 In 1948, the Assembly adopted a resolution with “prohibition
of the atomic weapon” in its title.80 One year later, Robert Oppenheimer urged
79
G.A. Res. 1(I), ¶ 5(c), Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the
Discovery of Atomic Energy (Jan. 24, 1946).
80
G.A. Res. 192(III), Prohibition of the atomic weapon and reduction by one-third of the armaments
and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council (Nov. 19, 1948).
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the United States Atomic Energy Commission not to produce the
thermonuclear bomb (hydrogen bomb, H-bomb), which he qualified as a
“‘weapon of genocide’ and ‘beyond any military objectives.'”81 Nevertheless,
nuclear weapons became the cornerstone of deterrence strategies during the
Cold War. Besides multilateral agreements against nuclear testing and
establishing certain exclusionary zones,82 only bilateral arms control
agreements were established regarding nuclear weapons.
A disarmament clause (Article VI) was included in the NPT in 1967,
yet little progress was made thereafter. Proponents of a nuclear-weapon-free
world became disillusioned and started to ponder new solutions on how to
achieve this goal. In 1997, Costa Rica submitted a “Model Nuclear Weapons
Convention” to the United Nations as a discussion document, which had
originally been drafted by a group of disarmament experts, lawyers, scientists,
and others.83 In the same vein, a plan entitled “13 Practical Steps related to
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” was submitted at the end of the NTP
Review Conference in 2000. The plan recommended States take concrete
disarmament steps. Yet, it failed to achieve any results; one year after the
conference, the United States withdrew its support.84
As a consequence, in 2006, the International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), a non-governmental organization
raising awareness about the dangers of nuclear war, founded the International
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Campaign (ICAN).85 ICAN became
an umbrella organization encompassing various groups advocating for nuclear
disarmament. It launched its first denuclearization campaign at the 2007 NPT
Review Conference where it presented an updated version of the “Model
Nuclear Weapons Convention.”86 Despite renewed enthusiasm for nuclear
81

Tom Sauer & Joelien Pretorius, Nuclear Weapons and the Humanitarian Approach, 26 GLOB.
CHANGE, PEACE & SEC. 233, 238 (2014).
82
For an outline of relevant instruments, see infra pp. 20–39.
83
Proposed Nuclear Weapons Conventions (NWC), THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Jan. 29,
2021), https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-nuclear-weapons-convention-nwc/; Deputy
Permanent Rep. of the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the U.N., Letter dated Oct. 31, 1997, from the
Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary
General, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/52/7 (Nov. 17, 1997).
84
CENTRE FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE
THREAT ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 375–76 (2000), www.nti.org/media/pdfs/npt
2kfd.pdf?=1316544426; Gibbons, supra note 7, at 13.
85
The Campaign, INT’L CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, https://www.icanw.org/the_
campaign (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
86
It was also presented to the U.N. General Assembly in 2007. See Permanent Reps. of Costa Rica
and Malaysia to the U.N., Updated Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, in letter dated Dec. 17, 2007, from
the Permanent Reps. of Costa Rica and Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/62/650 (Jan. 18, 2008).
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disarmament with the beginning of Barack Obama’s presidency in the United
States, the initiative was left without much response.
At the NPT Review Conference in 2010, the ICRC President, Jakob
Kellenberger, gave a prominent speech that addressed the aftermath of
Hiroshima, significantly contributing to framing the issue of nuclear weapons
as one of humanitarian concern.87 For the first time since the drafting of the
NPT, language reflecting a humanitarian lens was included in the final
document of the NPT Review Conference. Furthermore, the ICRC publicly
called for the start of a negotiation process to ban nuclear weapons,
encouraging international organizations and NGOs to publish reports
outlining the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. This gave new
momentum and magnified the humanitarian discourse’s reach.88 Thereafter,
ICAN started advocating for a complete ban on nuclear weapons, convinced
that this was the only way to eliminate the risk of destructive humanitarian
consequences caused by nuclear explosions.89 The campaign gained traction
among civil society organizations and States alike.
This led to the first “Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear
Weapons” in March 2013. Hosted by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,90 all States were invited to participate: 127 did so.91 The conference
included a series of presentations on the effects of nuclear weapon explosions
on various aspects of life and managed to adopt an overarching humanitarian
lens to discuss the issue. While the Oslo Conference was deemed a success,
the NWS made the conscious, concerted decision not to attend.

87
Jakob Kellenberger, Bringing the Era of Nuclear Weapons to an End: Statement by Jakob
Kellenberg, President of the ICRC, to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps, Geneva, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Apr.
24, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/statement/nuclear-weapons-statement-200410.
htm; ALEXANDER KMENTT, THE TREATY PROHIBITING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: HOW IT WAS ACHIEVED AND
WHY IT MATTERS 19 (2021); Alexander Kmentt, The Development of the International Initiative on the
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and its Effect on the Nuclear Weapons Debate, 97 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 681, 683 (2015) [hereinafter Kmentt, Development of International Initiative].
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Bonnie Docherty, A ‘Light for All Humanity’: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
and the Progress of Humanitarian Disarmament, 30 GLOB. CHANGE, PEACE & SEC. 163, 172 (2018); see also
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(2013).
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2018/614664/EPRS_BRI(2018)614664_EN.pdf.
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impacts of nuclear weapons, it never made a statement at the Conference in relation to a potential treaty or
political process, probably due to its NATO membership.
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The second conference, held in Mexico in February 2014, cumulated
an attendance of 146 States,92 a quantitative improvement of participation
which testified to the growing visibility of the issue. Juan Manuel Gómez
Robledo, the Vice Minister for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights of
Mexico, officially called for the start of a diplomatic negotiation process to
create a legally binding instrument that would ban nuclear weapons.93 While
this statement received applause from some participants, many States, notably
those that benefit from NWS’ nuclear postures (so-called nuclear umbrella
States), did not support such a drastic proposition. Germany and Australia, for
example, communicated skepticism and reiterated their support for the NPT
regime.
The third and last conference was held by Austria in December 2014,
with an increased 158 States participating.94 While this included the United
States, United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan, other NWS continued to boycott
the conference.95 By the end of the conference, 127 countries signed the
“Humanitarian Pledge,” which called for filling the legal gap regarding the
prohibition of nuclear weapons and working to “stigmatize, prohibit and
eliminate” nuclear weapons.96 While the United States had reiterated ideas of
progressive disarmament, this did not convince a large swath of the
audience.97
This momentum reverberated into other fora. South Africa’s statement
on the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons gained 159
signatures by 2015.98 The United Nations General Assembly further
92

RAY ACHESON, BEATRICE FIHN, & KATHERINE HARRISON, REPORT FROM THE NAYARIT
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Foreign Affs. (Feb. 14, 2014) (on file with Reaching Critical Will).
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Report, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014) https://www.ibtimes.com/china-sends-official-posing-academicattend-vienna-nuclear-conference-report-1744914.
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renamed at the 2015 NPT Review Conference due to the large number of adhesions. See Michael Linhart,
Deputy Foreign Minister of Austria, Pledge Presented at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact
of Nuclear Weapons (Dec. 9, 2014). For discussion of the legal gap, see Nystuen & Egeland, supra note 29.
97
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681.
98
Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty, Permanent Representative of S. Afr. to the U.N. in Geneva, Joint
Statement on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (Apr. 24, 2013), in REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. DEP’T:
INT’L REL. & COOP. The pledge was endorsed by 159 states. See Sebastian Kurz, Fed. Minister for Eur.,
Integration and Foreign Affs. of Austria, Statement to Conference on Disarmament (Mar. 3, 2015); Kmentt,
Development of International Initiative, supra note 87, at 687.

440

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 31 NO. 3

established an open-ended working group which produced a report stating that
a majority of States were in favor of starting negotiations for a treaty banning
nuclear weapons.99 Despite strong opposition by the United States and France,
in December 2016 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 71/258, “Taking
Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations,” to formally
elaborate the TPNW as a binding treaty.100
Negotiations started in March of 2017 with 130 participating States.
While NWS and their allies boycotted the negotiations conference, ICAN
actively contributed through lobbying activities. The final version of the
TPNW was adopted by the United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally
Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons on July 7, 2017 by a
majority of 122 states, with one abstention and one vote against.101 Its
adoption was met with significant worldwide reporting and celebrations.102
The same year, ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its “groundbreaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such weapons,”
which offered worldwide coverage.103 The TPNW entered into force on
January 22, 2021, ninety days after Honduras became the fiftieth state to ratify
it.104 Proponents of the TPNW used this event to further raise awareness and
disseminate the treaty’s messages, including by organizing a high-level event
at the United Nations,105 which was widely covered in daily news around the
world.106
99
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100
G.A. Res. 71/258, Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations (Dec. 23, 2016).
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The formalities surrounding the TPNW inform regarding which States
have adhered to the treaty via ratification or intend to join as indicated by their
signature. As of May 1, 2022, sixty States have ratified or accessioned to the
treaty107 and twenty-nine additional States are signatories.108 A closer look at
the division between the TPNW States parties and those States that have not
committed to the TPNW reveals strong patterns. No declared or de facto
NWS109 has ratified, nor signed the treaty. The same is true for umbrella
States.110 Nor has Iran, which is allegedly working on the acquisition of
nuclear weapons, committed to the TPNW. Because only the States with no
connection to nuclear weapons have signed and adhered to the TPNW, this
suggests that the TPNW has not brought substantial change to the policy or
behavior among the States that have committed to it so far. Rather, the treaty
screens between States that complied with the agreement’s obligations before
ratification from those that did not—and did not intend to. Thus, the States
parties’ ex ante costs for adherence were rather low. They do incur ex post
costs, however, as they are legally committed to comply with the treaty’s
obligations, foregoing future policy options regarding nuclear weapons. These
facts provide credibility to the TPNW’s signaling.
Accordingly, the creation process of the TPNW has procured a high
level of visibility for the treaty to the extent that no State could ignore or deny
its signal. Creating the signaling device did not incur lengthy or complicated
negotiations, because only like-minded States were involved.111 As such, the
negotiations served to unite States interested in sending the TPNW’s signal,
yet also served as an exclusionary process that established a legal divide
Nuclear Treaty Enters into Force, AL-JAZEERA (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/22
/landmark-anti-nuclear-treaty-enters-into-force; Eric Johnston, As U.N. Nuclear Treaty Comes into Force,
Japan Sees Different Path to Nonproliferation, THE JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021),
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107
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109
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110
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supra note 13, at 309, 332–33. For a comprehensive overview of the behavior and response of NWS and
umbrella states during the treaty negotiation process, see KMENTT, supra note 87, ch. 7.
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between the States that would ratify and those that would not. This screening
allowed States parties to signal the TPNW’s content to outsiders.
Importantly, while the approval rates for the idea of a nuclear ban treaty
rose during its creation and was still relatively high at the TPNW’s adoption,
the numbers of ratifications and signatures are significantly lower. The latter
numbers also stand in contrast to higher approval rates for the United Nations
General Assembly Resolution on “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons” (A/RES/75/40)112 and other resolutions adopted in 2020 that
welcome the adoption of the TPNW.113 While many States are willing to
support the TPNW’s cause, few are ready to formally adhere to the legal
regime. This suggests that treaty adherence is more costly and thus credible
than political statements and resolutions. NWS’ and NATO’s efforts to keep
allies, umbrella States, and others from joining the TPNW aim to further
increase their costs for adhering, thereby dissuading allies and other States
from joining and cementing the divide.
B.

The Treaty’s Messages

The TPNW’s content defines its signal’s substance. In an attempt to
unambiguously prohibit, delegitimize, and stigmatize nuclear weapons and
related activities and policies, the TPNW is a purist treaty with clear-cut
provisions. This allows strong and coherent signaling of values, expectations,
and intentions. The TPNW sends four messages: that nuclear weapons are
illegal, immoral, and dangerous, and that nuclear disarmament should
advance. These messages are written into the treaty’s preamble and
operational provisions.
The TPNW’s first message is that nuclear weapons and related
activities are illegal. The illegality of nuclear weapons is the legal contribution
and baseline of the weapons ban treaty. While the preamble hints at this and
describes why a legal ban is necessary, namely because it “constitutes an
important contribution towards the achievement and maintenance of a world
free of nuclear weapons,”114 the TPNW’s operational provisions
comprehensively and undoubtedly prohibit activities related to nuclear
112
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weapons. Article 1 of the TPNW notably forbids States to “develop, test,
produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess, or stockpile nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,” threaten or use nuclear weapons,
and receive their transfer.115
States parties also commit not to assist or benefit from those with
nuclear weapons. This includes the prohibition to transfer nuclear weapons,
assist or encourage activities prohibited by the treaty, seek or receive any
assistance from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited, or allow “any
stationing, installation, or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction
or control.”116 Such obligation excludes adherence of nuclear umbrella States
that benefit from extended deterrence (unless they engage in immediate and
complete disarmament as per Article 4 of the TPNW).
The TPNW further obliges States parties to submit declarations
regarding their past or present ownership, possession, or control of nuclear
weapons or their toleration within their jurisdiction.117 It also obliges States
parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements.118 In addition to a
program for disarmament, it binds States parties to implement their
obligations and foresees victim assistance and environmental remediation, as
well as international cooperation and assistance.119 This is complemented by
formal provisions,120 including the obligation to organize meetings of States
parties. As such, the treaty’s obligations and prohibitions establish the
complete illegality of nuclear weapons, as well as joint cooperation in this
regard.
In addition, the TPNW’s preambular paragraph 10 unites States parties
around the legal position that “any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary
to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the
principles and rules of international humanitarian law.” Paragraph 11 also
reaffirms that “any use of nuclear weapons would be abhorrent to the
principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience,” which
corresponds to a certain interpretation of international humanitarian law
(IHL). While this has no direct legal effect of its own, it does indicate that all
115
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States parties perceive these rules and principles of international law in this
way.121
The second message that the TPNW conveys is that nuclear weapons
are immoral and illegitimate. The preamble notes in its second paragraph the
States parties’ concern about the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences
that would result from any use of nuclear weapons,” which justifies nothing
else but these weapons’ complete elimination. Cognizant of the “grave
implications for human survival” and mindful of “unacceptable suffering and
harm,”122 inter alia, the preamble acknowledges “the ethical imperatives for
nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclearweapon-free world.”123 The reference to the principle of humanity and the
dictates of public conscience in preambular paragraph 11 further refers to
ethical standards against nuclear weapons. In addition, the preamble appeals
to moral authority by “stressing the role of public conscience in the furthering
of the principles of humanity,” which it links to “the call for the total
elimination of nuclear weapons.”124 It also recognizes related efforts by actors
other than States parties, such as the United Nations, the Red Cross
Movement, religious leaders, and the “hibakusha.”125 Thus, the treaty projects
the moral message but also seeks broader moral authority than would arise
only from States parties or the cause itself.
As its third message, the treaty communicates that nuclear weapons are
dangerous. According to its third preambular paragraph, States parties are
“[m]indful of the risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons,
including from any nuclear-weapon detonation by accident, miscalculation or
design, and emphasiz[e] that these risks concern the security of all humanity.”
Besides setting the context of these risks, namely catastrophic consequences
and grave implications, the preamble further states that a nuclear-weapon-free
world would be “a global public good of the highest order” that serves “both
national and collective security interests.”126 The danger of nuclear weapons
121
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is thereby mainly linked to humanitarian considerations, which intend to shift
the focus from state-based security, such as international and national
security, to human security.127 Yet, with the reference to national and
collective security interests, the message also includes that nuclear weapons
pose threats to States. In this context, it is interesting that preambular
paragraph three says that “all states share the responsibility to prevent any use
of nuclear weapons.” By not limiting the responsibility to States parties, this
wording projects the given perspective beyond the treaty membership and
signals expectations to NWS.
The fourth message is that nuclear disarmament needs to move forward.
Preambular paragraph fourteen communicates the States parties’ concern of
“the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the continued reliance on nuclear
weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, and the
waste of economic and human resources on programmes for the production,
maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons.” With this, the treaty
communicates that action is urgent and necessary. Furthermore, States parties
would be determined to act towards a world free of nuclear weapons and “to
achieving effective progress toward general and complete disarmament.”128
The preamble also reaffirms “that there exists an obligation [as per Article VI
of the NPT] to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations
leading to nuclear disarmament.”129 While these statements certainly
communicate the States parties’ frustration and impatience that NWS do not
engage in more serious disarmament efforts,130 they also signal their
expectations in this regard. The involvement of several small NNWS that
were previously barred from discussions on nuclear weapons further indicates
that NNWS were not willing to let NWS dominate the discourse, and the
TPNW was a way for them to take back some control.131
Article four of the TPNW further signals such expectations toward
NWS and nuclear umbrella States. The provision, entitled “Towards the total
elimination of nuclear weapons,” notably obliges a State party that “owns,
possesses, or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” to
127
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“remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as
possible.”132 Umbrella States shall also “ensure the prompt removal of such
weapons,”133 among other obligations contained in Article 4. While this
operational provision certainly only applies to States parties, these obligations
serve to signal precisely what actions are expected from NWS and umbrella
States.
Accordingly, the TPNW’s straightforward and clear provisions define
the signal’s substance, namely that nuclear weapons are illegal, immoral, and
dangerous, and that nuclear disarmament should advance. While the treaty
unites States parties around this common understanding, its substance is
crafted such that messages are also communicated to those States that have
not adhered. Interestingly, the treaty’s structure—a relatively long preamble
and relatively few and short operational provisions—indicates that the
signaling of values, perceptions, and expectations are as important, or even
more important, than the signaling of States parties’ intentions.
Yet, the TPNW’s signaling has limits. As a contractual, formal
arrangement under international law, the substance it conveys only reflects
States parties’ views and commitments. There is a coherence between its
aspiration to fully eliminate nuclear weapons and related messages in its
preamble and its operational provisions. However, the message that nuclear
weapons are illegal only reflects the States parties’ legal situation—no legal
effects can be projected onto outsiders. Similarly, as a formal treaty, the
TPNW only signals that its States parties perceive nuclear weapons as
immoral and dangerous. Though this view may be shared by many around the
world, the treaty only represents the views of those States that have adhered.
The expectation regarding the advancement of nuclear disarmament also does
not engage NWS and other outsiders. Yet, these are signals that effectively
inform outsiders of TPNW States parties’ common standing regarding nuclear
weapons.
Furthermore, because the TPNW binds States to legal commitments,
the focus of the treaty’s signaling is on States’ actions. Indeed, the States
parties’ renouncement of any benefits that can arise from possessing nuclear
weapons or nuclear deterrence, including benefitting from alliances with
NWS, make the signal costly and credible. As such, based on its formal
functioning, the TPNW most effectively signals what the States parties
commit towards each other, namely their common intentions. The TPNW’s
signaling of values, perceptions, and expectations towards outsiders is less
132
133
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strong. In essence, this means that the TPNW States parties signal to outsiders
via the treaty that “we (the States parties) want nothing to do with nuclear
weapons, nor should you (the outsiders) have anything to do with nuclear
weapons.” Yet, as a formal contractual arrangement, the TPNW more
effectively signals “we (the States parties) want nothing to do with nuclear
weapons.” This difference in effectiveness is exacerbated by the fact that
States remaining outside the treaty communicate their understanding and
intentions according to the otherwise applicable international rules.
C.

The Outsiders’ Law

As the TPNW divides insiders and outsiders and also serves to signal
its content to the outsiders, the question remains what implication this division
has on those States that remain outside. From a legal perspective, the TPNW
leaves outsiders bound by the other applicable international rules. States that
do not adhere to the TPNW are therefore indicating that they choose the other
applicable international law—even if they have never issued any specific legal
position on the issue. As such, these States communicate perceptions, values,
and intentions other than those of the TPNW. While the generally applicable
law on nuclear weapons remains ambiguous, except regarding certain
geographical exclusion zones, States’ preference for that law indicates that
they do not perceive the threaten of the use or the actual use of nuclear
weapons as clearly illegal, immoral, or dangerous to the extent that they
cannot even be possessed.
Most analyses regarding the effects of the TPNW on existing
international law focus on its relationship to the NPT.134 This is because the
NPT forms the current basis for the world’s nuclear order. Most importantly,
the NPT establishes that the United States, Russia, China, the United
Kingdom, and France possess nuclear weapons in all legality,135 a norm that
134
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TPNW proponents intended to challenge by offering an alternative treaty
regime that does not tolerate or legitimize nuclear weapons. The NPT,
however, remains in essence a nonproliferation treaty that seeks to curb
horizontal nuclear proliferation.136 It does not explicitly or directly address the
legality of a State’s own possession and use of nuclear weapons.
Accordingly, the most relevant international rules concerning nuclear
weapons are those on their use. These rules and their interpretation have
evolved over time. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not
generally deemed illegal under existing international law,137 in particular
because in 1945, there was no instrument prohibiting attacks against civilian
populations and objects specifically by air warfare.138 Yet even after the
adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945 and the Geneva Conventions
in 1949, it was mostly undisputed that no instrument existed that specifically
prohibited the possession or use of nuclear weapons.139 The UNGA adopted
Resolution 1653 in 1961, however, which stated that the use of nuclear
weapons was contrary to the “spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and,
as such, a direct violation of the United Nations Charter.”140
Thereafter, a legal debate between two dominant schools of thought
emerged. The first, the minority school of thought, considered that the laws
of war did not apply to nuclear weapons as they had become obsolete after
States manifestly disregarded them during World War II.141 In opposition, a
majority of scholars argued that IHL principles did apply to nuclear weapons;
136
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139
See Adam Roberts, Law, Lawyers, and Nuclear Weapons, REV. INT’L STUD. 75, 75–84 (1990);
Elliott L. Meyrowitz, The Opinions of Legal Scholars on the Legal Status of Nuclear Weapons, 24 STAN. J.
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thus, debates revolved around their application.142 In the following years, most
legal scholars agreed that the use of nuclear weapons was illegal and rejected
exceptions for military necessity143 or self-defense,144 except in situations of
lawful reprisal as a response to an adversary’s first use of such weapons.145
Other scholars warned that the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence
purposes, or as a means of “massive retaliation,” would be unlawful.146
Scholars also debated who could benefit from the principle of distinction,147
whether nuclear weapons were inherently indiscriminate,148 caused
unnecessary suffering,149 or qualified as poisonous weapons.150 The adoption
of the 1967 NPT, as well as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)151 and
the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (not in force as of May 1,
2022),152 did not alter this legal situation, although these treaties limited
nuclear transfers and testing.
142
Hisakazu Fujita, First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Strategy vs. International Law, 3 KANSAI
U. REV. L. & POL. 57 (1982); Meyrowitz, supra note 138, at 166.
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243–244 (1969); William T. Mallison, The Laws of War and the Juridical Control of Weapon of Mass
Destruction in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 343 (1967); ROBERT W. TUCKER,
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Warfare, 30 MIL. L. REV. (1965); MYRES MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961); WILLIAM
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In 1994, the international community sought to clarify the existing law.
The United Nations General Assembly, as per its Resolution 49/75, asked the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) to clarify the legality of the threat of use
and use of nuclear weapons.153 The Court rendered its Advisory Opinion in
1996, which failed to determine conclusively the law. The ICJ first held that
no customary rule specifically prohibited or authorized the use of nuclear
weapons. The Court admitted that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
most likely be contrary to the rules and principles of IHL.154 Nevertheless, the
ICJ presented a caveat stating that it could not “conclude definitively whether
the threat or use of nuclear weapons be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be
at stake.”155
The Advisory Opinion was controversial. In their dissenting opinions,
Judges Weeramantry, Koroma, and Higgins opposed the findings of the Court,
criticizing inter alia the ICJ’s reasoning in its application of the law, the lack
of legal basis for the conclusion,156 as well as the general vagueness of the
exception.157 Others criticized the Court’s conclusion by commenting “that in
certain cases of self-defence humanitarian law no longer applies is […]
dangerously like an application of the discredited doctrine of Kriegsraison
geht vor Kriegsmanier”158 or by highlighting the absence of a definition for

153
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https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/95, (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
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Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 74 (July
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Conclude Definitively . . .” Non Liquet Revisited, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 109, 112, 118 (1998); Ole
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 131 (Laurence Boisson De Chazournes &
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INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 153 (Laurence
Boisson De Chazournes & Philippe Sands, eds., 1999).
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the new concept of “extreme circumstances of self-defence.”159 The ICJ
President’s statement asserting that “the Court’s inability to go beyond this
statement of the situation can in no way be interpreted to mean that it is
leaving the door ajar to recognition of the legality of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons”160 did not contribute much clarity.
Commentators largely accepted the Court’s logic that the legality of a
threat of use of nuclear weapons would depend on the legality of the use itself.
This is sometimes referred to as the “Brownlie formula.”161 It had been noted
that while IHL would prohibit certain threats, such as threatening to attack a
civilian population in order to spread terror,162 nothing would indicate that the
threat of breach of any IHL rule would be illegal.163 Others clarified that
nuclear threats should primarily be assessed under jus ad bellum,164 and it has
been argued that threats of force would be illegal in any circumstances under
the United Nations Charter.165
Subsequent work continued to study the question but did contribute to
clarifying the law. As such, there is “no single or unequivocal legal answer”
regarding the current status of the legality of nuclear weapons.166 In most
instances, the use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful under international
law, although exceptions exist despite being unlikely or, as per the ICRC,

159
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Weapons, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 417, 430 (1997); Peter Weiss, The World Court Tackles the Fate of the Earth:
an Introduction to the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons, 7
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 313, 325–26 (1997). For discussions on the potential meaning of the
term, see Akande, supra note 154, at 209; Richard Falk, Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World
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difficult to envisage.167 Concretely, this would mean that “only low-yield
tactical nuclear weapons could realistically be used in accordance with the
rules of distinction and proportionality and then only in very specific and
highly improbable scenarios in an international armed conflict between
nuclear powers.”168 This example, however, does not take into account
environmental law.169 Nonetheless, nuclear weapons are not illegal per se.170
NWS’s legal positions suggest that the Advisory Opinion still reflects
the generally applicable international law. Indeed, the legal positions refuse
restrictive legal conclusions that would limit NWS’s ability to use nuclear
weapons. In particular, NWS continue to reserve themselves the right to use
nuclear weapons in “extreme circumstances of self-defence”171 The White
Papers of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France all use very
167
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similar terms. Russia and Pakistan present a very similar doctrine.172 China
adopted a self-defensive nuclear strategy, which implies that it reserves itself
the right to use nuclear weapons in certain situations of self-defense.173 As the
first NWS to do so, China excludes the first use of nuclear weapons. Although
the lawfulness of NWS’s policies can be disputed,174 these do remain the
relevant State practices.
In response to the adoption of the TPNW, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France stated that “there will be no change in the legal
obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons.”175 The P5
further declared that the “TPNW will not be binding on our countries, and we
do not accept any claim that it contributes to the development of customary
international law.”176 As such, the NWS hinder the emergence of any
customary rule based on the TPNW that would unequivocally prohibit the use
of nuclear weapons or nuclear threats. Even if such a rule were to emerge, this
opposition would make the rule inapplicable to NWS as they would be
considered a “persistent objector.”177 By their statements, NWS have not only
declared that the TPNW has no legal effects on them and actively countered
its further legal development into customary international law, but they also
explicitly recommitted to the otherwise applicable rules. Furthermore, fortytwo States have also communicated that they would not support the TPNW,178
thereby also emphasizing that the law generally applicable to nuclear weapons
better represents the perceptions, values, and intentions than the law of the
TPNW and its signals.
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With regard to particular geographical zones, several treaties contain
clear prohibitions. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty prohibits military activities,179
including nuclear explosions,180 in Antarctica. The 1967 Outer Space
Treaty181 explicitly prohibits the placement and use of nuclear weapons in
orbit around Earth,182 which is echoed by the 1979 Moon Treaty.183 Finally,
the 1971 Seabed Treaty prohibits States parties from placing weapons of mass
destruction or any testing or launching facility on sea-beds and ocean floors.184
States that are not parties to the TPNW, including many NWS, have joined
these prohibitions. In addition, five regional treaties establish nuclearweapon-free zones (NWFZ) that prohibit nuclear weapons.185 These
prohibitions, however, are lex specialis rules as opposed to the lex generalis
rules on the legality of nuclear weapons at the global level.
Accordingly, while the TPNW has brought legal division that enables
it to signal to outsiders, this division also leads the outsiders to remain bound
by the generally applicable international law. International law other than the
TPNW generally remains ambiguous regarding nuclear weapons’ legality. In
NWS’s view, international law authorizes the use of nuclear weapons when
their State survival is at stake. NWS and partner States have re-emphasized
this authorized use after the TPNW’s adoption. The legal divide established
by the TPNW leads to the conclusion that States that have not joined the
TPNW share this view, even if they have never communicated their legal
positions. In addition, the legal divide cannot be overcome due to treaty law’s
formalism and rigidity. States can only switch from one camp to another
through costly adherence to the TPNW—uncostly political statements of
intentions or values do not mean much when refusing adherence. While this
barrier gives credibility to TPNW’s signaling, it also solidifies the legal divide
as it makes States’ moves from one camp to another unlikely. As much as
treaty law’s formality and rigidity enables clear and credible signaling, it also
impedes change.
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A Global Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone

The TPNW’s signaling impacts the treaty’s role in nuclear politics as
well as the treaty’s characterization. Because the legal divide shields States
that have not adhered to the treaty from any direct legal effects, the TPNW is
not particularly threatening to NWS and its partner States. Rather, the treaty
allows better communication between its States parties and the outsiders,
ultimately laying a foundation for potential cooperation between the two
camps. From a substantive point of view, by most effectively signaling that
“we (the States parties) want nothing to do with nuclear weapons,” the
TPNW’s signaling based on its legal effects is analogous to that of NWFZ
treaties. This suggests that the TPNW can be characterized as a global NWFZ
treaty,186 which has multiple implications.
NWFZ are geographical areas in which nuclear weapons are not
tolerated, established by treaty, characterized by an absence of stockpiling,
producing, acquiring, and testing of nuclear weapons, and maintained through
a system of verification and control.187 The five treaties establishing NWFZ
each contain a provision renouncing nuclear explosion devices that generally
comprises prohibitions to develop, manufacture, acquire, possess, station, or
test nuclear weapons, to seek assistance to do so, to allow other States to do
so on their territory, or to encourage other States to engage in those
activities.188 The treaties’ protocols also prohibit the States parties from using,
or threatening to use, nuclear weapons.189

186

A similar analogy was made by BLACK-BRANCH, supra note 13, at 268, 276–77.
G.A. Res. 3472 (XXX) B, at 24, ¶ 1 (Dec. 11, 1975); For an overview of the functioning and
oversight mechanisms of NWFZ, see Michael Hamel-Green, Nuclear Deadlock, Stalled Diplomacy: The
Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Alternative—Proposals, Pathways, Prospects, J. PEACE &
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 1, 2–3 (2021) [hereinafter Hamel-Green, Nuclear Deadlock]; Elizabeth
Mendenhall, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Contemporary Arms Control, 14 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 122,
122–51 (2020); VALERIA PUGA ALVAREZ, FUNCTIONAL PEACE? THE “FIRST WAVE” OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONFREE ZONES PROPOSALS IN THE COLD WAR (2018); P. MOORTHY, NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE (2006).
188
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of
Tlatelolco) art. 1, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 754, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco]; African
Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty arts. 3–5, Apr. 11, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 698 (Pelindaba Treaty) [hereinafter Pelindaba
Treaty]; South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga) arts. 3, 5–6, Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 U.N.T.S.
24592 [hereinafter Treaty of Rarotonga]; Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Bangkok
Treaty) art. 3, Nov. 27, 1971, 1981 U.N.T.S. 33873 [hereinafter Bangkok Treaty]; Treaty on a NuclearWeapon-Free Zone in Central Asia arts. 3 & 5, Sept. 8, 2006, 2970 U.N.T.S. 51633.
189
Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco art. 3, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 754, 634 U.N.T.S.
364; Additional Protocol I to the Pelindaba Treaty art.1, K.A.V. 9116; Protocol to the Treaty on Southeast
Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS.,
https://treaties.unoda.org/t/bangkok_protocol (last visited May 25, 2022) [hereinafter Bangkok Treaty
Protocol]; Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 188, art 1.
187

456

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 31 NO. 3

NWFZ are disarmament and denuclearization tools to ensure that
nuclear weapons and their associated risks are absent in a particular region.190
NWFZ treaties are based on the premise that nuclear weapons have the
potential to cause massive damage. The Cuban missile crisis was at the origin
of the Tlatelolco Treaty, for instance.191 At the time, Mexico explained that
the NWS’s lack of initiative regarding nuclear disarmament left NNWS with
the responsibility to act themselves.192 In the case of the Rarotonga Treaty, the
former Australian Defence Minister Kim Beazley admitted that the treaty was
aimed primarily against France’s nuclear testing in the Pacific.193 Despite such
specific concerns, the creation of NWFZ generally correlates with low levels
of nuclear confrontation and threats in a given region.194
NWFZ’s rationale and long-term goals also concern broader
considerations. It has been argued that the Tlatelolco Treaty served to reject
neo-colonial power and ensure regional sovereignty.195 This and other NWFZ
treaties were also adopted in the hope that other regions of the world would
follow, thereby promoting a universalism of their principles as well as relating
their efforts with progressive and total abolition of nuclear weapons.196 It has
also been argued that NWFZ treaties enable NNWS to position themselves as
proponents of a peaceful, non-nuclear world.197 Accordingly, the NWFZ
treaties’ rationale is similar to that of the TPNW. Most importantly, because
the NWFZ treaties’ substance, particularly their operational provisions,
strongly overlaps with that of the TPNW,198 they send analogous signals.
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If the TPNW signals the same as NWFZ treaties, then by its global
scope and adherence, the TPNW establishes a global NWFZ. Importantly, the
membership of the TPNW has a strong overlap with the membership of the
five treaties on NWFZ. As of May 1, 2022, fifty States of all sixty States
parties to the TPNW (eighty-three percent) are also parties to a treaty on
NWFZ. Only ten TPNW States parties have not joined a treaty on NWFZ.199
Taking the signatures without ratification of the TPNW, the percentage of
overlapping adherence is seventy-nine percent and only eight States have
signed the TPNW but not joined a treaty on NWFZ.200 Thirty States have
adhered to a NWFZ but neither signed nor ratified the TPNW.201 Such strong
overlap in adherence to the different treaties confirms the overlapping signal,
as States that are party to a NWFZ are more inclined to join the NWFZ than
those that are not.
This overlap raises the question of redundancy. In terms of legal
obligations, joining the TPNW is indeed mostly redundant for States parties
to a NWFZ to the extent that most obligations are nearly identical. Yet, the
TPNW does provide its own, independent signal. Moreover, the TPNW has
an adherence that is global rather than only regional and a higher number of
States parties, which means more mutual legal commitments among States,
and higher visibility. It is thus a stronger signal, particularly in terms of
credibility, as a high number of mutual legal commitments more effectively
binds States than a smaller number, although the NWFZ members’ costs for
ratification of the TPNW were minimal as they were already in compliance
with the TPNW’s primary obligations prior to its creation and ratification.
Accordingly, States’ double adhesion to both a NWFZ treaty and the TPNW
does not render the signaling of one or the other redundant but reflects a
coherent signaling via more than one legal instrument.
The TPNW’s signaling and characterization as global NWFZ pose
direct policy relevance. Just like NWFZ treaties, the TPNW provides
information on its members’ perceptions, values, expectations, and intentions
to outsiders, which allows them to make informed decisions and thereby
reduce uncertainty. This suggests, however, that the TPNW is less
199
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confrontational than generally perceived by NWS. Indeed, the legal divide
and signaling do not particularly threaten NWS but provide a basis for
cooperation, or at least coordination, between NWS and TPNW States parties.
As the TPNW signals that its members do not tolerate nuclear weapons in
their jurisdiction, this signal allows NWS to worry less about threats and risks
from nuclear weapons and related activities that could arise from these States.
This narrowing of the field of States of concern serves the interests of NWS,
which should incentivize NWS to respect and value the TPNW. At most, it
suggests that NWS can use the TPNW for strengthening nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation efforts, and thus acknowledges and strengthens the
TPNW States parties’ efforts, as well as incentivizes more States to join the
TPNW. At the very least, it suggests that NWS have no reason to work against
the TPNW.
In line with the fact that signaling allows international cooperation, the
TPNW’s signaling provides a basis for institutionalized cooperation between
its States parties and outsiders. As the TPNW’s signal communicates that no
nuclear threats arise from its member States, the NWS could reciprocate by
eliminating any nuclear threats against TPNW States parties. This can be
communicated by negative security assurances (NSA), which aim “to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear
weapons.”202 The five declared NWS made unilateral pledges on NSA to the
non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT in 1995, which were reflected
in United Nations Security Council Resolution 984.203 France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States stated that they would not use nuclear
weapons against NNWS that are party to the NPT and in compliance with its
obligations unless NNWS attack them in “association or alliance” with a
NWS. China went further. It has persistently declared that it will never use or
threaten the use of nuclear weapons against a NNWS or a NWFZ.204
Most relevant in relation to the TPNW, the Protocols to NWFZ treaties
establish NSA by ensuring that NWS refrain from using or threatening to use
nuclear weapons against any party or territory within the zones.205 Some also
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prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons in the zone.206 The Protocol II with
respect to denuclearization to Treaty of Tlatelolco was ratified by all declared
NWS. The Protocol II on no-use against Treaty members to Treaty of
Rarotonga, the Protocol I on no-use against Treaty members to Pelindaba
Treaty, and the Additional Protocol to Treaty of Semipalatinsk were ratified
by China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France, whereas the United States
only signed them.207 Only the Additional Protocol to the 1995 Bangkok Treaty
has so far not been signed by any NWS.208 Such broad engagement by NWS
suggests that they may offer renewed, unambiguous NSA that eliminate any
threats or use of nuclear weapons against or on the territory of TPNW states
parties.209
New NSA would recognize and help establish the TPNW as a global
NWFZ that protects its populations from the risks of nuclear weapons. NSA
could also create incentives for more States to join the TPNW, eventually
supporting global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In addition,
NSA could transform the current political confrontation between TPNW
States parties and NWS into broader cooperation. At a minimum, this would
show that NWS and its partners value the TPNW as a serious initiative and
support nuclear disarmament.
Accordingly, based on its signaling function, the TPNW can be
characterized as a global NWFZ. This implies that rather than for political
confrontation, the treaty can be used as a tool for cooperation between NNWS
and NWS. NSA would represent a form of contracting between TPNW States
parties and NWS, which would respond to the TPNW’s signaling and
strengthen the treaty regime. Admittedly, the TPNW was not created to seek
and establish cooperation with NWS and umbrella States but rather to
206
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confront them.210 It has also been argued that mentioning NSA in the treaty
would contradict its rationale to not tolerate nuclear weapons and its goal to
contribute to the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals, which would also
prevent the TPNW from representing a global NWFZ.211 Indeed, NSA or
collaboration with NWS are not mentioned in the TPNW.212 However, if
policymakers give appropriate attention to the TPNW’s signaling, NSA or
collaboration with NWS would be a logical consequence that would help
bridge the political polarization and turn the TPNW’s extra-regime
confrontation into cooperation.
CONCLUSION
Treaty law enables signaling to states that have not joined a given treaty
regime, namely outsiders. Treaties serve as signaling devices by providing
visibility to its messages and by screening between States that adhere to the
message and those that do not. Treaties further provide substantial clarity to
the signal. As contractual arrangements that legally bind States, treaties also
provide a certain level of credibility to the signal. Treaties further establish
legal divides which, although rigid and exclusionary, hamper political
confrontation because outsiders remain shielded from direct legal effects.
Indeed, as signaling by treaty provides information, thereby reducing
uncertainty, signaling may serve as basis for cooperation between parties to a
treaty and outsiders. Intra-regime cooperation creates a basis for extra-regime
collaboration.
The analysis of the TPNW’s signaling leads to the conclusion that
Christopher Ashley Ford’s description of the TPNW as “emptily divisive
virtue-signaling”213 is not completely accurate. The TPNW does effectively
signal substance and thereby is not hollow. While it signals values, it also
signals perceptions, expectations, and intentions. The latter is most effectively
signaled. Overall, while the TPNW’s principal message is that “we (the States
parties) want nothing to do with nuclear weapons, nor should you (the
outsiders) have anything to do with nuclear weapons,” as per treaty law’s
functioning, the TPNW more effectively signals “we (the States parties) want
210
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nothing to do with nuclear weapons.” Lastly, although the TPNW is divisive
from a legal perspective, the treaty’s signaling lends to extra-regime
collaboration rather than confrontation.
This has implications on the characterization of the TPNW and its role
in nuclear politics. As per its signaling, the TPNW resembles a treaty
establishing a global NWFZ. This is supported by its membership, which
mostly comprises States that are party to a NWFZ treaty. As long as no NWS
or umbrella States adhere, the treaty may even be considered rather like a nonarmament treaty which prevents NNWS from acquiring or benefiting from
nuclear weapons than a veritable disarmament treaty which brings states to
renounce nuclear weapons and associated policies. Similar to NWFZ treaties’
protocols, NSA would represent a form of contracting between TPNW states
parties and outsiders which would value and strengthen the TPNW. Most
importantly, it would bridge current political divides and foster cooperation
between the TPNW States parties and NWS.
In general, the assessment of political effects of international law needs
to duly consider the law’s legal effects and formal functioning. In the case of
the TPNW, assessing its political effects as a formal contractual arrangement
governed by international law cannot be dissociated from its legal effects. The
TPNW may well serve as vehicle for diffusing norms at the individual level.
Yet at the level of States, which remain the main subjects of international law
and take the formality and rigidity of international law seriously, the treaty
serves as a signaling device. If norm diffusion is or gets stuck, which is
possible, then this may be the primary function of the TPNW. In this case, the
TPNW may have failed its initiators’ high ambitions, but it would still be
valuable and represent a cornerstone that further nuclear disarmament efforts
can be built upon.
Regarding the broader generalization of these findings, it is noteworthy
that the TPNW is a special case by the fact that its initiators created the treaty
specifically to confront NWS and nuclear umbrella States while having no
illusion that these States would join the treaty in the short term. Therefore,
additional research could further test how treaty law enables signaling to
outsiders, in particular regarding other weapons ban treaties which great
powers have not joined, such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention214
and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.215 This could also be applied to
more complex, regulatory treaties, such as the Arms Trade Treaty216 or treaties
214
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not in the security field. Other research could assess how treaty law supports
or undermines norm diffusion, especially as norms of appropriateness and
beliefs are not bound by the formality and rigidity of international law. This
could culminate in a broader research agenda on how treaties affect outsiders.
For the politics of the TPNW, the TPNW’s nature and functioning as a
treaty under international law are relevant. Policymakers should pay more
attention to the legalities, notably as they allow to see beyond the political
confrontation for which the TPNW is currently used. Indeed, as much as the
TPNW serves to signal, its limits as per treaty law makes it less threatening to
outsiders. Accordingly, treating the TPNW like a global NWFZ can relax
tensions and allow bridging the current political polarization and division.
Maybe the discourse between the two camps is already softening.217 Maybe
the related confrontation is also relaxing already at some levels.218 The P5 also
stated that they are committed to avoid war between NWS and nuclear
stability on January 3, 2022.219 Relying on how international treaty law works
may offer the next step towards international cooperation on nuclear
disarmament.
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